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# Globalization, Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Support for Global Governance: An Individual Level of Analysis

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# Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....i

Globalization, Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Support for Global Governance: An Individual  
Level of Analysis ..... 1

Abstract ..... 1

1. Introduction.....2

2. Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and global governance: Literature review .....2

3. Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and global governance linkage.....5

4. Methodology.....9

5. Result.....12

6. Discussion and conclusion.....17

7. References ..... 19



# Globalization, Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Support for Global Governance: An Individual Level of Analysis

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## Abstract

This research aims to investigate the variation in people's confidence in global governance. Established on the cosmopolitan liberal theory of international relations, this research tests the argument that confidence in global governance is rooted in the cosmopolitan views of citizens; that is, citizens' views that the world has universal ethics centered on humanity. Thus, those with higher levels of cosmopolitan views are expected to be more confident in and have more support for global governance. However, these cosmopolitan views do not manifest out of thin air. I argue that the extent to which countries are exposed to globalization shape the cosmopolitan views of their citizens. Thus, cosmopolitan views intermediate the relationship between exposure to globalization and confidence in global governance. I test this hypothesis using World Values Survey wave 7 (2017-2020).

## 1. Introduction

Confidence and trust in global governance at the individual level is relatively under-explored empirically in international relations literature. Most discussions about confidence in global governance imply that individual citizens do not matter a lot because the workings of global governance depend significantly on state support. This argument is unsurprising, because the majority of global governance actors are inter-governmental organizations whose members are states rather than individual citizens. It is states that provide financial and other forms of support for the operation of intergovernmental organizations. Thus, it is the confidence of the state that matters most for the survival of intergovernmental organizations and, consequently, global governance.

However, for democratic countries, the voices of citizens significantly shape government policies. The ways in which states spend money are, to a significant extent, also influenced by public opinion. Thus, money provided to support the operations of international organizations by democratic states is subject to public accountability. Despite the fixed amount of money contributed regularly as part of a country's obligation as a member of the international organization, the country's support for the organization depends on public evaluation, especially in democratic societies, both directly and indirectly through the peoples' representatives in parliaments. In other words, public opinions on global institutions indirectly influence the operation of intergovernmental organizations as well as global governance. Therefore, it is important to examine how the citizens view global governance in international relations scholarship.

The main purpose of the research is to explain variations in the confidence of individual citizens towards global governance. This research is important because much of the research on the idea of global governance or cosmopolitan liberalism in the discipline of international relations takes a theoretical approach. Furthermore, the units of analysis in most of global governance studies are generally the institutions, the states, or the systems of governance. Rarely do they approach the issue from the perspective of the individual. It is this lacuna that I will try to fill in through this research.

## 2. Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and global governance: Literature review

The triangular relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and trust in global governance is under-explored in academic literature. While the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism is relatively clear, with a consensus that globalization is the driving force behind cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006), the relationship between cosmopolitanism and trust in global governance is relatively problematic. Part of the problem is that the two concepts are supposedly so strongly related that their respective definitions and boundaries are unclear. This is, for example, suggested in Norris' (2000) work on global governance and cosmopolitan citizens. In her work, Norris does not differentiate between globalization as a dynamic process from globalization as global governance. Similarly, despite a clear operational definition of cosmopolitan citizens, she conflates cosmopolitan feelings with confidence in global governance. To Norris, confidence in global governance is the other

side of the same coin as cosmopolitan feeling. She suggests that cosmopolitanism comprises not only self-identification with world citizenship, but also confidence in global governance and support for globalization policies. This muddies the direction of the causal relationships among these three concepts.

Norris' definition of cosmopolitanism branches cosmopolitanism out into three dimensions, but this is also problematic as the three dimensions are not necessarily compatible with each other. For example, empirical analysis of the relationship between support for global governance and identification with world citizenship shows a significant negative correlation. This is surprising, because people who identify themselves with the world are presumed to support global governance. If the two measures—identification with world citizenship and support for global institutions—are part of the same latent variable of cosmopolitanism, then they should align.

Norris and Ingleheart (2009) suggest that globalization drives cosmopolitanism. Using country-level globalization index, they find that people living in more globalized countries tend to have higher levels of trust towards foreigners. They support this claim by running different models using media exposure as one indicator of globalization exposure, and find that greater media exposure leads to higher trust of foreigners. These results remain consistent despite some individual and country-level controls. However, Norris and Ingleheart do not connect their analysis to confidence in global governance.

Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann's (2008) observations also find similar results. Using the concept of transnationality as a measure of 'globalization experience', willingness to assign accountability to the world community for certain problems, and attitudes towards foreigners as measures of cosmopolitanism, they find that people with higher transnationality indexes tend to be more willing to assign responsibility to the global community and are amicable towards foreigners. Their analysis indicates that experiencing globalization can shape one's world views regarding global issues and attitudes towards others. Like Norris and Inglehart (2009), this research treats attitudes toward global governance and attitudes towards strangers as the two sides of the same cosmopolitan coin.

A more complex analysis of globalization and cosmopolitanism is conducted by Pichler (2012). Disentangling cosmopolitanism into three dimensions—ethical, political, and identity—he finds that country-level globalization indexes are negatively associated with individuals' global identities, but positively associated with the so-called 'political cosmopolitan' orientation. Closer observation reveals that it is political and social globalization that significantly drive this political cosmopolitan orientation. However, Pichler does not find any direct relationship between globalization of any sorts with an ethical cosmopolitan orientation. These results suggest that political cosmopolitan orientations are partially driven by political and social globalizations only. Meanwhile, "ethical cosmopolitan orientations appear to be independent from globalization and stronger global identities seem to be constrained by higher levels of globalization" (Pichler 2012: 36).

Finally, a weak relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism is also observed by Zhou (2016). Examining the World Values Survey Wave 5 data, Zhou did not find a significant relationship between globalization of any sorts with individuals' global self-identification (a cosmopolitan self-image). Only after analysing the globalization variable

with the age cohort does Zhou find a significant relationship between globalization and global self-identification, leading him to conclude that the effect of globalization applies to young people only. His findings suggest that while globalization does not drive global self-identification among people generally, globalization, especially economic and social globalization, does result in a generational shift towards higher levels of global self-identification. This means that globalization, along with economic prosperity, drives cosmopolitan feelings among younger people.

These findings all indicate that globalization is indeed an important driving force behind cosmopolitanism. Regardless of how scholars measure globalization and cosmopolitanism, analysis shows that globalization strongly affects cosmopolitan orientation in one way or another. Nonetheless, these findings only solve part of the globalization-cosmopolitan-global governance equation. What they show is what predicts cosmopolitanism, including that globalization—defined either as a country-level or individual-level variable—can predict cosmopolitanism. What is left unsolved is what predicts our levels of trust in global governance. Can globalization directly affect our confidence in global institutions? Or are there other factors which shape variations in individual confidence levels in these global institutions? We need to look at other research to answer these questions.

A national survey conducted by Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) in Germany find that German citizens' beliefs in the capacity of international institutions to solve problems is shaped by the perception of transnational interdependencies (in terms of functional sensitivity as well as moral commitments). Remarkably, this relationship is moderated by citizens' sense of their own vulnerability; that is, their beliefs that the national government is incapable of solving such problems. His findings suggest that globalization is again the driving force behind support for global governance. When an individual believes that her life can be affected by any problem beyond her country, she is more likely to prefer that the problem be solved by international institutions. Her preference for global governance—that is, her preference for supranational institutions' handling of transnational issues—is even stronger when she also believes that her government is incapable of dealing with said issues. In addition, Ecker-Ehrhardt finds that transnational commitment or moral cosmopolitanism boosts one's preference for global governance: those who feel obliged towards strangers are more likely to prefer global governance to solve global problems. This empirical finding provides a direct link between a sense of globalization at the individual level and support for global governance. While this research also treats cosmopolitan feeling as the moderating variable for the relationship between globalization and preference for global governance, Ecker-Ehrhardt does not find this to be a moderating effect, thus leaving this triangular relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and support for global governance unanswered.

Quite different from Ecker-Ehrhardt, other research investigating support for international organizations ignores the role of cosmopolitan views in shaping confidence in international organizations (IOs) and global governance. According to Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015), it is the organizations' capacity to deliver, as well as citizens' general confidence in political institutions, that shapes people's confidence in IOs, rather than general identification with world citizenship. The weak effect of the cosmopolitan view is further



confirmed by the most recent study by Verhaegen, Scholte, and Tallberg (2021), using elite surveys from several countries. Their analyses show that elites' satisfaction with institutional qualities of IOs is most consistently related to legitimacy beliefs of IOs: when elites are more satisfied with democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in IOs, they also regard these IOs as more legitimate. These findings suggest the importance of institutional satisfaction as an explanation of attitudes toward IOs.

What we have learned from these findings is that most scholars seem to assume that confidence in global governance is part of cosmopolitanism. That is why most either test the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism, or the relationship between globalization and confidence in global governance. However, as most of the research tends to stretch the ideas of cosmopolitanism out, they fail to see the triangular relationship between the three concepts empirically. This is unfortunate because empirically and theoretically, cosmopolitanism is a contested concept with different dimensions. Therefore, it is important to disentangle the dimensions of this concept and examine their relationship.

In this research, I try to test whether global orientation—that is, a cosmopolitan view—and confidence in global governance are related at the individual level. If so, how are the two elements related and are there structural factors which shape the relationship? I will elaborate on the possible explanation in the following section.

### 3. Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and global governance linkage

Understanding the relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and support for the global governance requires careful definition of the three concepts. Thus, I will start with conceptual and operational definitions of each concept before proceeding to explore the theoretical expectation regarding the relationship between them.

The definition of globalization in this research is borrowed from Dreher (2006). It refers to “the process of creating networks of connections among actors at intra or multi continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods. Globalization is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence” (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019: 2). This definition is in turn based on the works of Clark (2000) and Norris (2000) in the collaborative work of Nye and Donahue (2000).

In this research, globalization can be operationalized into three dimensions: economic, social, and political. Economic globalization measures the extent to which a country is exposed to trade and financial globalization. Social globalization measures the extent to which a country's population is exposed to interpersonal, informational, and cultural globalization. Finally, political globalization measures the extent to which a country is involved in political interactions with other countries, both through international organizations and directly (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See the operational definitions of the three variants of globalization in the method section of this paper.

The second concept requiring discussion is cosmopolitanism, of which there are several different views. Generally, according to Oxford Reference, cosmopolitanism refers to “the philosophical idea that human beings have equal moral and political obligations to each other based solely on their humanity, without reference to state citizenship, national identity, religious affiliation, ethnicity, or place of birth” (Brown 2022). Cosmopolitans generally believe that human beings, by nature, are members of a single universal community. The most important normative claim advanced by cosmopolitans is that political boundaries and national identities are morally arbitrary and that all human beings should be held as the primary unit of moral worth (Appiah 2006; Beitz 1999; Linklater 2002; Singer 2008).

Conceptually, some scholars distinguish cosmopolitanism as a normative idea from cosmopolitanism as an empirical attribute (Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008). As a normative idea, cosmopolitanism refers to the Kantian view of world government, equipped with supranational laws to deal with issues of world citizenship (Brown 2005; Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008). Understood this way, cosmopolitanism suggests support for the federation of states or the ‘world state’ (Brown 2005).

As an empirical attribute, cosmopolitanism refers to one’s attitudes, opinions, values, and orientation towards the social world (Norris 2000; Robbins 1998; Roudometof 2005). For example, Norris (2000) argues that cosmopolitanism is a view that identifies oneself more broadly with continent or with the world as a whole and put greater faith in the institutions of global governance. More explicitly, Norris delineates that “cosmopolitans can be expected to support policies designed to dismantle protectionist economic barriers ... Cosmopolitans can be expected to be comfortable living and working in different countries, familiar with travel well beyond their national boundaries, and fluent in languages, as well as connected to international networks through global communications” (Norris 2000: 159).

Cosmopolitanism, as a measurable attitude, entails three dimensions (Held 2002). First, it suggests that cosmopolitans are aware of the interconnectedness of political communities through their social, economic, and environmental aspects. Second, cosmopolitans are cognizant of collective fates: any challenge faced by others will be seen as a shared challenge, prompting collective action to overcome it. Finally, cosmopolitans appreciate difference and diversity. They are able to see any problem from the point of view of others. Therefore, those with cosmopolitan attitudes tend to respect difference and care for others regardless of their origins.

This research uses the attitudinal dimension of cosmopolitanism. However, the definition I use is different to that of Norris (2000). In my opinion, Norris’s definition is too broad because she defines cosmopolitanism in three dimensions: identity, institution, and policy. Her measure of cosmopolitanism involves identification with regional or world citizenship, confidence in global institutions, and support for global economic policy such as free trade. Unfortunately, she overlooks the importance of individuals’ attitudes towards strangers, an idea central to cosmopolitan works in the literature of global ethics (Shapcott 2020).

This is the main dimension of cosmopolitanism on which I focus in this research. Instead of taking the broad operational definition of cosmopolitanism, I limit the definition of cosmopolitanism to attitudes towards strangers (Appiah 2006; Beitz 1999; Singer 2008).

This definition of cosmopolitanism is typically used in international relations literature, especially in literature on international ethics (Langlois 2007; Shapcott 2020). According to this definition, cosmopolitanism is a view that morality is a universal principle applying to all of humanity regardless of social origins and citizenship. What defines us morally is our humanity. Thus, all humanity should have one universal standard: what is considered morally good for one community should also be good for all others. This will lead us to treat others as we would treat ourselves, and brings us to the idea that we have the same rights as others of different nationalities. If we have the right to have a job in our country, then foreigners should also have the same rights. The reverse is also true: we are also entitled to have a job in a foreign country. In short, for cosmopolitans, “all humans have equal moral standing. More generally, a cosmopolitan commitment means one’s national identity and well-being should not come at the expense of outsiders. Obligations to friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens must be balanced with obligations to strangers and to humanity” (Shapcott 2020: 210).

While confidence in or support for global governance can be regarded as an important element of Kantian cosmopolitanism, it is also linked to the legitimacy of global institutions. That is why most research on public confidence in global governance or international organizations centers on the concept of legitimacy (Bernstein 2011; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2020; Dellmuth and Schlipphak 2020; Scholte 2019). Scholars of IOs and global governance generally find that public confidence in global governance is influenced by to what extent people feel represented in IOs, both through their national governments and their civil society organizations; to what extent people perceive the effectiveness of global governance; and to what extent they trust the institutions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; 2020). However, most research on public support for global governance implies that confidence in global governance is an indication of cosmopolitan attitudes, resulting in researchers failing to correlate this confidence with attitudes towards strangers, which is the essence of cosmopolitanism from the perspective of global ethics.

The logic of the triangular relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and confidence in global governance follows naturally from the definitions of the three concepts. Globalization allows for cross-border interactions among peoples that ultimately lead to shared views, interests, lifestyles, and so on. When one lives in a country greatly exposed to globalizing conditions, people become used to sharing feelings with others of different nationalities. As people become acquainted to living with a variety of cultures, tastes, and products, then they will tend to have shared standards of ethics. In other words, cosmopolitan views are more likely to be adopted. As explained by Zhou (2016: 156):

Economic globalization exposes people to foreign products and cultures and creates cosmopolitan consumerism over the world. This globalizing consumerism brings in a convergence of cultural tastes, aesthetics, lifestyles, and self-identity. Political globalization challenges national sovereignty and the nation-state’s role as the sole legitimate political entity. It limits the capacity of the state to build a sense of common identity and national unity. Social globalization extends people’s ties and interactions across borders. Proliferation of cultural contacts and social networks across national borders promotes awareness, understanding, and appreciation of people and cultures in other countries. Social globalization has a socializing effect that generates more cosmopolitan orientations.

People adopting cosmopolitan views are more likely to support and have confidence in global governance because they believe that universal ethical principles should be protected by global governance. Global governance is needed to define, regulate, and maintain universal ethics; without it, it is difficult to maintain and enforce ethical principles, meaning ethical principles will be carried out selectively, likely with bias towards certain interests. Humanitarian intervention, for example, does not work effectively because there is no universal rule accepted by the international community. This makes this intervention political and interest-based. To cosmopolitans, the selective implementation of this action is unfortunate.

However, globalization does not necessarily lead to individual confidence in global governance. This is because globalization can affect individuals' views of global issues differently. Exposure to economic globalization, for example, can lead to either economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction, depending on how globalization affects one's personal economic situation. As the effects of economic globalization are diffusive and go in different directions, these effects can cancel each other out. Thus, we cannot expect a direct relationship between globalization and an individual's confidence in global governance. Similarly, understanding a country's political interactions with other countries and how it politically interacts in international organizations cannot help us predict the level of a country's citizens' support for global governance. This is because a country's political interactions in the international community cannot, to a significant extent, be felt directly by citizens. Therefore, we cannot expect a direct relationship between globalization and individuals' confidence in global governance.

The ideas elaborated above lead us to derive these two related hypotheses as follows:

*H1: The more one adopts a cosmopolitan view of the world, the more one will be confident in global governance.*

*H2: The more a country in which a respondent lives is exposed to globalization, the more the respondent will adopt cosmopolitan views.*

These hypotheses suggest that the relationship between globalization and support for or confidence in global governance is mediated by a cosmopolitan view of the world. Figure 1 shows how the two hypotheses work.

**Figure 1. Mediation Analysis of Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Support for Global Governance**



**4. Methodology**

This research relies on World Values Survey data released in wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2022). There are 57 countries/territories in the data set. The surveys were conducted from 2017-2021 using face-to-face interviews with a total of 76,897 randomly sampled respondents. The dependent variable in this research is a composite index of several questions asking how much confidence a respondent has in the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). The specific question a respondent is asked is:

*I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?*

Respondents are offered four optional answers to measure their level of confidence: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all. For the purposes of this paper, I reversed the scale to make it more intelligible; thus, the higher the value, the higher support for global governance. Figure 2 shows that all items are consistent with one another, as indicated by Cronbach’s alpha score of more than 0.8.

**Figure 2. Cronbach’s Alpha for Global Governance Components**

Test scale = mean(standardized items)						
Item	Obs	Sign	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average interitem correlation	alpha
un	43478	+	0.8253	0.6916	0.6581	0.8851
imf	41767	+	0.8564	0.7468	0.6314	0.8726
wto	39644	+	0.8630	0.7701	0.6247	0.8694
who	41854	+	0.8235	0.7018	0.6555	0.8839
wb	40445	+	0.8653	0.7721	0.6232	0.8687
Test scale					0.6385	0.8983

The intervening variable is the cosmopolitan view. In this research, the cosmopolitan view is operationalized as a latent variable consisting of four questions:

1. *How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them? [When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants?]. Answers: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree Nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.*
2. *I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? [People of another nationality]. Answers: Trust Completely, Trust Somewhat, Do Not Trust Very Much, Do Not Trust at All.*



3. *How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?*
  1. *Let anyone come who wants to*
  2. *Let people come as long as there are jobs available*
  3. *Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here*
  4. *Prohibit people coming here from other countries.*
4. *How proud are you to be [country's nationality]? Answer: Very proud, Not very proud, Quite proud, Not at all proud.*

For this research, I reversely code items 2 and 3 to bring them in line with the other two items. I generate latent variable ranging from -2.02 to 4.02 (mean = 0, sd = 1). As demonstrated by Figure 3, four out of five goodness of fit indicators show that the model fits well, meaning that the latent variable of cosmopolitanism is strongly related to the items used to measure it.

The main predictor is the level-2 variable measuring the globalization rate of the country. There are three types of globalization used as predictors for the models. First, economic globalization measures the extent to which a country is exposed to trade and financial globalization. Trade globalization is measured by sum of exports and imports in goods and services as share of GDP. Financial globalization measures capital flows and stocks of foreign assets and liabilities.

Second, social globalization measures the extent to which a country's population is exposed to interpersonal, informational, and cultural globalization. Interpersonal globalization is measured by international voice traffic, international financial transfers, international tourism, and the share of foreign-born persons. Informational globalization is measured by the stock of patent applications by foreigners, sum of in-and-outbound international students, and export of high technology products. Cultural globalization is measured by the number of McDonald's restaurants and Ikea stores in a country as well share of trade in cultural and personal products.

Finally, political globalization measures the extent to which a country is involved in political interactions with other countries, both through international organizations and directly. Specifically, political globalization is measured by the number of embassies and non-government organizations in a country as well as the frequency with which a country participates in UN peacekeeping missions. These measures represent a country's exposure to foreign actors with political and social motives in one's own territory (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019).

Figure 3. Cosmopolitanism: A CFA Model

```

Endogenous variables
Measurement:  immview jobscarce trother natpride
Exogenous variables
Latent:      Cosmo
Fitting target model:
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -231730.98
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -231716.36
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -231716.18
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -231716.17

Structural equation model           Number of obs   =   45,496
Estimation method = ml
Log likelihood = -231716.17

( 1) [immview]Cosmo = 1
    
```

Standardized	OIM		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
<b>Measurement</b>						
<b>immview</b>						
Cosmo	.4675532	.0085111	54.93	0.000	.4508717	.4842347
_cons	2.927901	.0107793	271.62	0.000	2.906774	2.949028
<b>jobscarce</b>						
Cosmo	.4479999	.0083807	53.46	0.000	.4315739	.4644258
_cons	1.889822	.007825	241.51	0.000	1.874485	1.905159
<b>trother</b>						
Cosmo	.3720373	.0076155	48.85	0.000	.3571112	.3869634
_cons	2.466609	.0094257	261.69	0.000	2.448135	2.485084
<b>natpride</b>						
Cosmo	.2106044	.0072992	28.85	0.000	.1962983	.2249105
_cons	2.027371	.0081946	247.40	0.000	2.01131	2.043432
<b>var(e.immview)</b>						
	.781394	.0079588			.7659497	.7971497
<b>var(e.jobscarce)</b>						
	.7992961	.0075091			.7847132	.8141501
<b>var(e.trother)</b>						
	.8615883	.0056665			.8505534	.8727663
<b>var(e.natpride)</b>						
	.9556458	.0030745			.9496389	.9616907
<b>var(Cosmo)</b>						
	1	.			.	.

Fit statistic	Value	Description
<b>Likelihood ratio</b>		
chi2_ms(2)	88.510	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(6)	5200.147	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
<b>Population error</b>		
RMSEA	0.031	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.026	
upper bound	0.036	
pclose	1.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
<b>Information criteria</b>		
AIC	463456.350	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	463561.054	Bayesian information criterion
<b>Baseline comparison</b>		
CFI	0.983	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.950	Tucker-Lewis index
<b>Size of residuals</b>		
SRMR	0.012	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.425	Coefficient of determination

LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(2) = 88.51, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

To avoid bias in estimating the effect of globalization on both the mediating variable (cosmopolitanism) and the main dependent variable (support for global governance), I control for several confounders. First, I control for the civil liberty index rating, based on Freedom House measurements. The rating is between 1 (high) and 7 (low). The civil liberty index measures to what extent media is free and independent and how free individuals are to express their views and adopt and practice their preferred religions and ways of life. The inclusion of this civil liberty variable is because civil liberty and cosmopolitanism are strongly related. It is possible that the cosmopolitan view is shaped by social environments that support civil liberty rather than exposure to globalization.

Secondly, I also control for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education, immigration status, and income. All these variables are suspected to shape one's view about the world. For example, immigrants are more likely to harbor cosmopolitan view than non-immigrants, as are people from higher socio-economic backgrounds (higher levels of education and income status).

The general models to be estimated in this research are:

$$Cosmopolitanism_{ic} = \alpha + \phi globalization_{ic} + \beta'X_{ic} + \epsilon_{ic} + \nu_{0c} \dots \dots \dots (1)$$


$$GlobalGovernance_{ic} = \alpha + \gamma Cosmopolitanism_{ic} + \phi globalization_{ic} + \beta'X_{ic} + \epsilon_{ic} + \nu_{0c} \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

This is a two-step estimation process. In the first step, I estimate the mean of respondent cosmopolitanism from the contextual variable; that is, the globalization index controlling other confounders ( $x$ ). In the second stage, I use the predicted mean of cosmopolitanism to predict the level of confidence of respondent  $i$  in country  $c$  regarding global governance while controlling for other confounders ( $x$ ). The last term on the right-hand side of the equations refers to the random coefficients of the intercepts.

### 5. Result

As shown in Figure 4, there is empirical evidence that globalization in general has some positive association with cosmopolitan views. The more a country is exposed to globalization, the more its population harbor cosmopolitan views. This is especially true when the countries are exposed to social and cultural globalization. This is unsurprising, given that social and cultural globalization measure factual interactions between citizens and foreigners, thus their citizens experience factual globalization.

Figure 4. Globalization and Cosmopolitan Views: Country Aggregate



While globalization drives cosmopolitan views, globalization seems to have a meager role in shaping people’s support for global governance. As seen in Figure 5, there is no statistically significant relationship between all varieties of globalization and support for global governance. Countries exposed to globalization do not necessarily see their citizens supporting global governance. For economic globalization, the relationship between globalization and support for global governance seems to be counterintuitive: the more the populations of countries are exposed to economic globalization, the lower their support for global governance. Nonetheless, this can also indicate people’s dissatisfaction with the way





global economic institutions such as IMF, World Bank, and WTO manage the world’s economic problems. Exposure to economic globalization might be seen as one of the driving forces for economic inequality and other economic problems, with global economic institutions seen as being behind these trends. Thus, the more (especially developing) countries are exposed to economic globalization, the more they suffer from economic problems (Bisbee and Rosendorff 2020; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 2013).

Figure 5. Globalization and Support for Global Governance: Country-level




Figure 6 shows that support for global governance is driven to a significant extent by cosmopolitan views. Those thinking that all human beings deserve jobs, trust, and other rights, regardless of their origins and citizenship, tend to support global governance. Country-level observations also shows the pattern: countries where populations tend to harbor cosmopolitan views about the world tend to observe an increase in support for global governance. The pattern also applies to individual level (see the lower-right panel in Figure A1 in Appendix).

Figure 6. Cosmopolitan Views and Support for Global Governance: Country level




Table 1 shows the full specifications of the relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and support for global governance. There are two models specified in each of the categories of globalization. The first model estimates the predicted values of cosmopolitanism from the globalization variable, controlling for several demographic variables. On the second stage (model), I estimate the effect of cosmopolitanism on confidence in global governance, also controlling for several demographic variables.

Only economic globalization that has a direct effect on individuals' confidence in global governance. Confirming Figure 4, economic globalization has a direct negative effect on confidence in global governance. It is this strong direct effect of economic globalization that also drives the total effect of globalization on confidence in global governance. The total effect (direct + indirect effect) of this economic globalization, however, is quite small, at -0.0029937, despite the statistical significance. The small total impacts of globalization on support for global governance also apply for other categories of globalization (social and political).

**Table 1. Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Support for  
Global Governance: GSEM Models**

	Dependent Variable = Confidence in Global Governance			
	Social Globalization	Economic Globalization	Political Globalization	All Globalization Index
Support for Global Governance				
KOF Social Globalisation Index, de facto	-0.000107 (-0.33)			
KOF Economic Globalisation Index, de facto		-0.00303*** (-10.24)		
KOF Political Globalisation Index, de facto			0.000489 (1.72)	
KOF Globalisation Index, de facto				-0.00218*** (-4.48)
Cosmopolitanism	0.102*** (20.10)	0.102*** (20.34)	0.0969*** (19.88)	0.104*** (20.50)
Civil Liberties rating (1=high to 7=low) [Freedom House, 2020]	0.00808* (2.41)	0.00294 (0.94)	-0.00000717* (-2.18)	0.00263 (0.80)
Male	-0.0128 (-1.41)	-0.0150 (-1.65)	-0.00695 (-0.78)	-0.0137 (-1.51)
Age	-0.00290*** (-9.53)	-0.00251*** (-8.36)	-0.00294*** (-10.44)	-0.00269*** (-8.88)
Non-Immigrant	-0.0878*** (-3.57)	-0.134*** (-5.36)	-0.0938*** (-3.86)	-0.0947*** (-3.90)
Education	-0.0302*** (-11.80)	-0.0265*** (-10.53)	-0.0311*** (-12.87)	-0.0284*** (-11.22)
Income	0.0457*** (5.35)	0.0444*** (5.21)	0.0485*** (5.76)	0.0451*** (5.29)
Constant	0.194*** (4.44)	0.391*** (9.55)	0.178*** (4.88)	0.343*** (6.99)

Dependent Variable = Index of Cosmopolitanism				
KOF Social Globalisation Index, de facto	0.00726*** (21.04)			
KOF Economic Globalisation Index, de facto		0.0000558 (0.18)		
KOF Political Globalisation Index, de facto			0.00865*** (26.12)	
KOF Globalisation Index, de facto				0.0104*** (20.37)
Civil Liberties rating (1=high to 7=low) [Freedom House, 2020]	-0.135*** (-37.64)	-0.170*** (-49.05)	-0.000124*** (-32.85)	-0.141*** (-40.01)
Male	0.0114 (1.18)	0.00595 (0.61)	-0.00490 (-0.49)	0.0105 (1.08)
Age	-0.00363*** (-10.60)	-0.00242*** (-7.08)	0.000527 (1.58)	-0.00350*** (-10.23)
Non-Immigrant	-0.226*** (-9.07)	-0.326*** (-13.04)	-0.532*** (-19.96)	-0.282*** (-11.51)
Education	0.0497*** (18.55)	0.0622*** (23.41)	0.0892*** (34.18)	0.0520*** (19.58)
Income	0.0739*** (8.32)	0.0732*** (8.20)	0.0573*** (6.28)	0.0746*** (8.39)
Constant	0.0273 (0.59)	0.624*** (14.50)	-0.614*** (-15.18)	-0.127* (-2.49)
var(e.global_gov)	0.710*** (158.46)	0.708*** (159.03)	0.712*** (160.90)	0.710*** (158.56)
var(e.cosmopolitan)	0.845*** (138.18)	0.855*** (137.75)	0.907*** (136.84)	0.846*** (138.17)
Observations	43309	43309	44345	43309

*t* statistics in parentheses. All analyses are weighted

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Examining Table 1 in detail, we see that all forms of globalisation but economic globalization have strong positive associations with cosmopolitanism. People exposed to social and political globalization are more likely to adopt cosmopolitan views. The probability

of observing the coefficients of globalization-cosmopolitanism relationship if (the assumed) null hypothesis is true is close to zero, leading us to conclude that globalization in social-cultural and political dimensions has strong predictive effects.

The relationship between cosmopolitan views and support for global governance is also very strong. The more an individual adopts cosmopolitan views, the more she supports global governance. Each standard deviation increase in the cosmopolitan index predicts an increase in global governance support index by around 0.1 standard deviation on average. Again, the probability of observing such a relationship if the null relationship is true is very small, thus we conclude that cosmopolitanism is one of the drivers of support for global governance.

The statistical analysis also shows us that economic globalization has the strongest total effect on support for global governance. Yet, the effect is negative. Other dimensions of globalization have relatively meager total effects on support for global governance. These very small total effects are because there are null direct effects of globalization on support for global governance and relatively small yet statistically significant relationships between globalization and cosmopolitanism. Overall, these findings suggest that there is no direct effect of globalization on confidence in global governance. The relationship between globalization and confidence in global governance is mediated by cosmopolitanism.

## 6. Discussion and conclusion

The statistical analyses presented in this research support the two hypotheses proposed above. First, empirical analysis shows that people living in more globalized countries, especially those which are socially and politically globalized, are more likely to adopt cosmopolitan views of the world. Countries that allow their population to interact and integrate with immigrants and foreigners, and to be exposed to foreign products and foreign lifestyles to a significant extent, help to shape their population's view of the world. Such populations generally become more tolerant of immigrants and are prepared to share the country's resources with foreigners, as long as there are also some benefits contributed back to the country. For them, competition is a norm rather than a threat. Similarly, people living in countries hosting many politically motivated foreign actors, such as international governmental and non-governmental organizations, foreign diplomats, and political activists, are also more likely to adopt cosmopolitan views. It is very likely that those with cosmopolitan views live in capital cities, where the likelihood of encountering foreign political actors is higher.

Second, individuals adopting cosmopolitan views are more confident in global governance: the higher one's level of cosmopolitanism, the higher her confidence in global governance. This result seems to confirm Norris' suggestion that confidence in global governance is another indication of cosmopolitanism. Although in this research, I define cosmopolitanism exclusively as ethics towards strangers, it shows strong correlation with confidence in global governance. Thus, as hypothesis 2 suggests, the more one thinks that all people have the same rights and obligations regardless of nationality, the more she trusts in global governance. This is logical, as global institutions are important agents that help ensure that global ethics work for everybody.

The two findings support our general theoretical expectation that cosmopolitanism mediates the relationship between globalization (social-cultural and political) and individuals' confidence in global governance. People exposed to different cultures, social-political environments, and lifestyles as well as interactions with foreign actors tend to be tolerant to resource-sharing policies and have positive attitudes towards the strangers. With this cosmopolitan view, these people are more likely to have confidence in global governance. These findings provide additional empirical support to the existing literature that globalization drives cosmopolitan feelings (Beck 2006; Delanty 2006; Pichler 2009, 2012; Roudometof 2005)

The results explained above identify several lessons that requiring further exploration. First, contrary to the expectation, the relationship between economic globalization and confidence in global governance is not mediated by a sense of cosmopolitanism. On one hand, economic globalization directly affects confidence in global governance negatively. This suggests that exposure to economic globalization to a significant extent arouses dissatisfaction with global economic institutions. Instead of seeing global economic governance as the panacea to economic problems posed by globalization, people—especially those in disadvantaged economic situations—regard global economic governance as the cause for this globalization-driven economic problems (Bisbee et al. 2020; Bisbee and Rosendorff 2020).

In short, the strong negative relationship between economic globalization and confidence in global governance suggests that people living in countries dependent on foreign goods and capital are not confident in the way global economic institutions manage global economic challenges. This finding lends support to the work of Machida (2009) who finds that people living in poorer countries do not tend to support international governmental organizations. The upper-right panel in Figure 5 shows that support for global governance is relatively low in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Greece, whose exposure to economic globalization is high.

On the other hand, economic globalization is not statistically related to cosmopolitanism. This indicates that economic globalization does not stimulate a sense of cosmopolitanism, in contrast to other forms of globalization. It seems that economic globalization triggers a sense of negative competitiveness that considers immigrants as a threat to existing depleting resources. Populations in countries immensely exposed to economic globalization feel that globalization has crowded local people out of economic resources, to the extent that sharing resources with strangers cannot be tolerated. This finding seems to confirm Inglehart's hypothesis that individuals who feel unsecured economically are more likely to harbor nationalist attitudes (Inglehart 1997). This null relationship between economic globalization and cosmopolitanism is also in line with the one found by Zhou (2016).

However, if we examine the relationship between globalization, cosmopolitanism, and confidence in global governance based on the regime types of the countries in which the respondents live, there are several interesting findings. As shown in Table A1, globalization of any sorts exerts direct influence on confidence in global governance for people living in democratic societies. Both political and social globalization positively drive individuals'

confidence in global institutions. However, economic globalization continues to negatively affect confidence in the global institutions. These findings confirm the findings of both Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) and Pichler (2012). For non-democracies, all three dimensions of globalization negatively affect their citizens' confidence in global institutions. The negative effects of globalization on the variation in citizens' confidence in global governance reveal the different political and social dynamics inherent in democracies and non-democracies that statistically distort the causal direction in the relationship between globalization and confidence in global governance.

The role of regime type is even more significant if we examine the effect of political globalization on cosmopolitan attitudes among citizens of non-democracies. Again, as seen in the second equation in Table A1, political globalization negatively shapes cosmopolitan attitudes. For the citizens in non-democracies, the more their countries participate in global governance and actively interact with other political actors, the more citizens develop inward-looking perspectives. Again, internal socio-political dynamics within non-democracies might explain this tendency.

As for socio-demographic matters, younger generations tend to adopt more cosmopolitan views and have more confidence in global governance compared to their older generation. This result is relatively consistent with the one reported by Norris (2000) and also supports Norris' prediction that there would be a rising tide of popular support for globalization and cosmopolitan views and attitudes. Finally, people from higher socio-economic backgrounds are also more likely to adopt cosmopolitan views and support global governance. The results might not be surprising given that such people are part of the societies readily capitalizing the benefits of globalization. This finding again is in line with Norris (2000); Chaudhuri (2009); and Norris and Inglehart (2009).

Generally, all these findings point to central claims of cosmopolitan liberal theory, in which respect for and protection of universal ethics applying to all human beings, regardless of national origins, require global governance. Global governance is required to define, regulate, and maintain global ethics and to derive from the ethics the shared rules of the game that help manage global issues. Globalization generalizes social interactions among people across the globe, and these interactions will lead people to have shared views of the world, including views of how solve their collective problems. Thus, global governance is the best way to coordinate solutions for our collective problems for those living in the globalized world.

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Figure A1. Cosmopolitanism and Support for Global Governance: Individual Level




Table A1. Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Confidence in Global Governance: Democracies Vs. Autocracies

	Democratic Countries			Non-Democratic Countries		
	Social Globalization	Economic Globalization	Political Globalization	Social Globalization	Economic Globalization	Political Globalization
DV = Confidence in Global Institutions						
KOF Social Globalisation Index, de facto	0.00785*** (21.18)			-0.0182*** (-21.26)		
KOF Economic Globalisation Index, de facto		-0.00160*** (-5.06)			-0.0195*** (-25.90)	
KOF Political Globalisation Index, de facto			0.00254*** (8.48)			-0.0173*** (-10.16)
Cosmopolitanism	0.133*** (23.64)	0.134*** (23.95)	0.104*** (19.03)	0.134*** (12.43)	0.131*** (12.25)	0.121*** (11.13)
Constant	-0.719*** (-13.84)	0.162*** (3.54)	0.164*** (4.21)	2.855*** (24.21)	3.746*** (28.78)	2.338*** (18.27)
DV = Cosmopolitanism						
KOF Social Globalisation Index, de facto	0.00213*** (5.18)			0.00272** (2.96)		
KOF Economic		-0.00222***			0.000732	

Globalisation Index, de facto			(-6.34)			(0.89)
KOF Political Globalisation Index, de facto				0.0102*** (29.75)		-0.00605*** (-3.33)
Constant	0.608*** (10.38)	0.973*** (19.56)	-0.684*** (-15.91)	-0.0940 (-0.74)	0.0214 (0.15)	0.370** (2.93)
var(e.global_gov)	0.671*** (135.46)	0.680*** (137.37)	0.688*** (140.75)	0.660*** (71.63)	0.643*** (70.57)	0.687*** (73.23)
var(e.cosmo)	0.860*** (120.20)	0.860*** (120.38)	0.913*** (121.39)	0.811*** (66.67)	0.812*** (66.60)	0.811*** (66.27)
No. of Obs	33543	33543	34571	8830	8830	8830
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-84508.5	-84707.7	-88568.7	-20808.5	-20718.5	-20960.7
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*t* statistics in parentheses. All analyses are weighted.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



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